How to Do Things with Words

Reference: Austin, J. L. (1962). How to Do Things with Words. The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955. Oxford: Clarendon Press (ed. J. O. Urmson). Source file: austin-1962-how-to-do-things-with-words.pdf. Cited by Elephant 2000 - A Programming Language Based on Speech Acts (McCarthy 1989).

Summary

Austin’s posthumously edited William James Lectures are the founding text of speech-act theory. Austin begins by isolating a class of utterances - “performatives” (e.g. “I promise”, “I do”, “I name this ship”) - that do not describe or report but instead perform an action, and cannot be evaluated as true or false but only as happy or unhappy (felicitous or infelicitous). Through twelve lectures he progressively dissolves the performative/constative distinction in favour of a general theory in which every utterance performs a locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary act. The taxonomy of illocutionary force (verdictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives, expositives) directly anticipates Searle/Vanderveken’s Foundations Of Illocutionary Logic and the performative vocabulary of KQML and FIPA-ACL.

Key Ideas

Performative utterance: saying is doing. “I promise” is not a report of a promise - it is the promise.
Felicity conditions: instead of truth conditions, performatives succeed or fail by satisfying procedural, sincerity, and uptake conditions.
Locution / illocution / perlocution: three layers of every speech act - what is said, what is done in saying it, and what is achieved by saying it.
Five illocutionary classes (verdictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives, expositives) - taxonomy later refined by Searle into five primitives.
Dissolution of the performative/constative boundary: assertion itself turns out to be a species of illocutionary act.

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Conceptual Contribution

Claim: Many utterances are not descriptions that can be true or false but actions that are performed in the saying; and on closer inspection the descriptive/performative divide collapses, so every utterance is a layered act with illocutionary force.
Mechanism: Contrast between constative and performative utterances; introduction of felicity conditions (A.1-A.2, B.1-B.2, Gamma.1-Gamma.2 misfires and abuses); the tri-layer locution/illocution/perlocution analysis; provisional five-way classification of illocutionary verbs.
Concepts introduced/used: Performatives, Illocutionary Force, Felicity Conditions, Locutionary Act, Perlocutionary Act, Speech Act Theory
Stance: foundational / ordinary-language-philosophy
Relates to: Provides the raw speech-act ontology that Searle formalises in Speech Acts and that McCarthy imports in Elephant 2000 - A Programming Language Based on Speech Acts; the felicity-condition apparatus recurs under “feasibility” and “sincerity” preconditions in FIPA-ACL semantics and in Commitment-based Semantics.

Tags

#speech-acts #philosophy-of-language #foundational #austin #performatives

Summary

McCarthy proposes Elephant 2000, a speculative programming language whose inputs and outputs are speech acts — requests, questions, offers, acceptances, declinations, permissions, and promises — rather than ordinary I/O. A program’s correctness is then partly defined by the “happy performance” of those acts in Austin’s sense: answers must be truthful and responsive, promises must be kept, and the program must not accept what it has no authority to accept. The paper is an essay of seven design theses, most strikingly:

An Elephant program is itself a logical sentence (or syntactic sugar for one); its extensional correctness properties follow by logical consequence without a separate theory of programming à la Hoare.

Elephant programs do not need data structures: they can refer directly to the past (history of events and states), just as natural-language speakers do (“the passenger has a reservation iff she made one and hasn’t cancelled it”).

Programs have both input-output specifications (generalising illocutionary speech acts) and accomplishment specifications (generalising perlocutionary acts — what the program actually brings about in the world).

Commercial transactions exchange obligations; an Elephant program’s specification may include the fact that the obligation exchange happens as intended, again as a logical sentence.

McCarthy explicitly departs from Searle/Austin by taking a design stance (Dennett) on speech acts, introducing abstract performatives (including purely internal commitments the agent makes to itself) as a category of program event. The paper is the direct programming-language-side ancestor of modern Agent Communication Languages, Commitment-based Semantics, and Intent Formalization — all written a decade before the ACL field got going.

Key Ideas

Speech-act I-O language: programs communicate via request, question, offer, accept, decline, permission, promise, assertion, plus internal commitment

Program-as-logical-sentence: extensional properties are logical consequences, no Hoare axioms required

Direct reference to the past: no data structures, just history queries (has-reservation(psgr, flt) ≡ made-reservation ∧ ¬cancelled)

Illocutionary vs. perlocutionary specs: input-output (program’s own behaviour) vs. accomplishment (effects in the world)

Abstract performatives — internal commitments whose content is independent of outward expression

Obligation exchange as a first-class specification element for commercial/institutional programs

Takes a design stance on speech acts — adapts Austin/Searle rather than inheriting them

Authority / permission / obligation are specification concerns: the program need not be conscious of them

Explicit claim: deliberately non-AI — Elephant usages that do not require intelligence are the focus

Summary

Searle and Vanderveken construct a formalized logic of speech acts, filling the gap between philosophy of language and formal logic. The book recursively defines the space of illocutionary forces from five primitives (assertive, commissive, directive, declarative, expressive) via seven components of illocutionary force (illocutionary point, mode of achievement, propositional-content conditions, preparatory conditions, sincerity conditions, degree of strength, direction of fit).

It develops axiomatic propositional illocutionary logic, laws of illocutionary entailment, commitment, negation, conjunction, and conditionalization, and closes with a semantic analysis of over a hundred English performative verbs. The work is foundational for agent communication languages because it gives a rigorous semantics to the performatives (inform, request, promise, declare, etc.) later adopted by KQML and FIPA-ACL.

Conceptual Contribution

Claim: The space of possible speech acts is generated recursively from five illocutionary points and seven components of illocutionary force, and admits a genuine formal logic of success and entailment.

Mechanism: Axiomatic propositional illocutionary logic: laws of illocutionary entailment, commitment, negation, conjunction, and conditionalisation; closes with semantic definitions of over a hundred English performative verbs.

Concepts introduced/used: Speech Act Theory, Performatives, Illocutionary Force, Direction of Fit, Sincerity Conditions, Preparatory Conditions, Commitment-based Semantics, Mental State, Mentalistic Semantics

Stance: foundational / formal-semantic

Relates to: Supplies the philosophical semantics imported by KQML Language And Protocol and FIPA-ACL, and re-examined publicly in Agent Communication And Institutional Reality and A Common Ontology Of ACLs.

How to Do Things with Words

Summary

Key Ideas

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