Two Faces of Intention
Reference: Bratman, M. E. (1984). The Philosophical Review, 93(3), 375–405. Source file: bratman_two_faces_of_intention.pdf. URL
Summary
Bratman’s canonical statement of the planning theory of intention. He argues that commonsense psychology uses “intention” to characterise both actions (done intentionally) and mental states (intending to act), and that neither the desire-belief reductionist model (Davidson) nor the Simple View (to A intentionally I must intend to A) correctly captures the two faces. Instead, intentions are distinctive, irreducible states of mind that function as elements of partial, future-directed plans which coordinate conduct over time and with other agents.
Because intentions serve as inputs to further means-end reasoning and as filters on admissible options, they must satisfy internal and means-end consistency constraints; but they need not entail all their foreseen consequences as further intentions. Bratman develops the distinction between what one intends and the motivational potential of an intention (foreseen but unintended side-effects that one is nonetheless prepared to bring about), which dissolves classic puzzles about double effect without collapsing into the Simple View. The methodological priority of future-directed intention — intentions as ingredients of plans — became the philosophical foundation for the BDI architecture in AI.
Key Ideas
- Two faces: intentional action vs. intending (present- vs. future-directed).
- Rejection of the Desire-Belief reductive model.
- Rejection of the Simple View (intentional A-ing requires intending to A).
- Intentions as partial plans coordinating activity over time.
- Plan-consistency, means-end coherence, non-reconsideration norms.
- Distinction: what one intends vs. motivational potential (side effects).
- Future-directed intention has methodological priority.
Connections
Conceptual Contribution
- Claim: Intentions cannot be reduced to configurations of belief and desire; they are distinctive planning states whose function is to stabilise and coordinate future action, and the two uses of “intention” (for acts and for mental states) are united through the common role of such planning states rather than through an identity of content.
- Mechanism: Bratman argues against the Desire-Belief Model by showing planning creatures settle in advance on options that beliefs+desires underdetermine; against the Simple View by exhibiting cases where A is done intentionally without intending-to-A (e.g., foreseen side effects one is willing to accept). He replaces both with the Single Phenomenon View refined by a plan-theoretic account: intentions are inputs to further reasoning, demand consistency and means-end coherence, resist easy reconsideration, and possess motivational potential beyond strict intended content.
- Concepts introduced/used: Intention, Planning Theory of Intention, Practical Reasoning, Motivational Potential, Future-Directed Intention, Simple View, Single Phenomenon View
- Stance: philosophical theory
- Relates to: Philosophical foundation cited and formalised by Intention Is Choice with Commitment and Modeling Rational Agents within a BDI-Architecture; supplies the mentalistic vocabulary surveyed in Intelligent Agents Theory and Practice and operationalised in Agent-Oriented Programming; complements the external ascription view of Intentional Stance.
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