House on Rock - LangSec in Ethereum Classic
Reference: Meredith L. Patterson (2017). How to Build a House That Doesn’t Fall Apart (talk). Ethereum Classic Summit, Hong Kong, November 2017. YouTube
VIDEO
Summary
A LangSec critique of Ethereum aimed at the Ethereum Classic community, framed around the parable of the wise and foolish builders and Philip K. Dick’s “reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn’t go away.” Patterson argues Ethereum was built on sand — an ad-hoc, non-executable yellow-paper semantics; a hand-rolled Solidity parser; a test suite with no coverage for delegatecall or invalid opcodes; a design culture that scorned formal methods until hundred-million-dollar losses forced the issue.
The central technical argument is that the gas mechanism does not do what the yellow paper claims it does . Gavin Wood’s stated purpose — “sidestep the inevitable issues stemming from Turing completeness” — confuses a resource bound (a non-semantic, decidable property) with a safety guarantee (a semantic property that Rice’s theorem makes undecidable in general). Gas cannot show a contract “does nothing malicious”; it can only show it eventually halts. Worse, gas creates an adversarial economic game with direct monetary reward for tricking the accounting, and a perverse incentive for honest developers to omit runtime sanity checks because conditionals cost gas.
Patterson’s prescription for Ethereum Classic: standardise on KEVM (an executable operational semantics in the K framework), fix the VM test suite’s gaps, build languages that don’t hide implicit behaviour (method visibility defaults, fallback methods, delegatecall as naked eval), and invest in developer tools — IDEs, live debuggers, verification — that surface what a contract can actually do. “Code is law” requires the meaning of the code to be unambiguous, executable, and visible.
Key Ideas
Rice’s theorem bounds what gas can mean. Non-trivial semantic properties of arbitrary programs are undecidable; resource bounds are non-semantic. Gas therefore cannot sidestep Turing-completeness-induced safety problems, contrary to the yellow paper.Gas as adversarial game. The accounting is an attack surface, not a safety property; attackers are paid to win. Honest contract authors are weakly pushed toward removing checks to keep gas costs competitive.LangSec programmer–machine contract. Inputs must have a formal grammar; two implementations of the same spec must accept/reject identical inputs; semantics must be executable so claims about behaviour can be verified mechanically.Ad-hoc semantics breeds consensus failures. When the yellow paper and cpp-ethereum disagree, cpp-ethereum wins — the denotational semantics is decorative. Discrepancies between clients have already caused real Ethereum consensus failures.Test suites are part of software design. Official VM tests have no coverage for invalid opcodes or delegatecall — the exact instruction at the heart of the Parity multisig hacks. “VM tests” is false advertising; downstream VM implementations inherit the blind spot.Case studies of processing-fluency failure.
DAO: mutual recursion across a defender/attacker code boundary, missed in reviews because reviewers examine functions one at a time (cf. Leveson: accidents emerge from interactions ).Hacker Gold: =+ typed instead of += — a hand-rolled recursive-descent parser caught nothing; a Bison grammar would have surfaced a shift/reduce conflict.Parity multisig (July 2017): fallback method × delegatecall × public-by-default visibility = naked eval on attacker-controlled payload; $31M drained, $150M saved only by counter-theft.Parity multisig (Nov 2017): library contract re-initialised by an outsider then suicided, locking $153M in wallets whose code had vanished — “left-pad for multi-million-dollar table stakes.”
KEVM (K framework operational semantics) gives Ethereum an executable semantics; generated interpreter ~20× slower than cpp-ethereum but usable, and supports reachability-based proof of safety/liveness claims.Cognitive-science constraint. Miller’s 7±2 bounds how much implicit state a programming language can demand before human reasoning fails. Solidity’s implicit defaults (public methods, fallback dispatch, implicit conversions) exceed that budget.“Worse is better” is unconscionable in a financial system. Sacrificing correctness and completeness to ship first transfers the cost of undefined behaviour onto users.
Connections
Conceptual Contribution